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GEOFFREY BEST. -Humanity in Warfare. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1980. Pp. xi, 400. 
Anyone whose memory of London or of ruined German cities after the 
bombing of World War II leads him to regard this book's title as self-contradictory 
is profoundly mistaken. Even in the twentieth century warfare, as waged by the 
civilized nations, has been far more humane than that of primitive peoples. For 
example, in 1868 the victorious Maoris, who had just sacked the infant white 
settlement at Poverty Bay in New Zealand's North Island, not only slaughtered 
and mutilated all the settlers but ate as many of them as they could and then 
(writes my somewhat sarcastic authority) showed "the sacred light of civilization 
that was burning within them by potting the remainder of the corpses in tins and 
sending them as presents to their friends in the country". Eight decades later the 
professional soldiers of the belligerent powers in 1939-45 never contemplated such 
behaviour as this, - however beastly some of the governments they served may 
have been. 
Mr Best therefore chose a good subject when he began this study of the 
development of the humane conduct of civilized war. He takes his subject from 
the theories of Emmerich de Vattel in the 1750s through the French Revolution, 
and such events as the Declaration of Paris on maritime commercial warfare of 
1856, the foundation of the Red Cross and the series of conferences at Geneva and 
the Hague, from 1864 down to 1979 - of all of which he gives a convenient 
chronological table. 
The reader cannot help being impressed by the way in which the problems 
of one age reappear in another. To name a very current problem, what is a com-
mander to do about enemy guerillas? Everyone knows how Spanish guerillas 
troubled French invaders in the Peninsular War, and it is therefore interesting 
to read that French guerillas had given Spanish invaders similar trouble in 1793. 
The Spanish commander protested to his French opponent in terms that amount to 
a classic statement of the problem. His own troops had not come to indulge in 
"murder and rapine"; he could recognize a properly enlisted opponent "wearing 
the uniform, badges and equipment" of a soldier, but if anyone, peasant or 
bourgeois, in civilian garb used arms against his troops, he would "immediately 
hang him and ... be justified in doing so". Here sentiment may grieve for the patriot 
executed for striking a blow against the invader of his country, but the Spanish 
general's question still stands unanswered -how is thefranc-tireur out of uniform 
to be distinguished from any other brigand or terrorist? Any commander worthy of 
the name knows he has responsibilities to the individual men under his command 
which he must take seriously, and he cannot stand idly by if enemy civilians 
declare an "open season" on them (with no bag limits). 
All along statesmen have remained uneasily aware that the stresses of wartime 
could create problems for which it was not easy to lay down effective rules in 
peacetime. Hence, for example, the preamble to the regulations approved at The 
Hague in 1907 declares that nations had "been inspired by the desire to diminish 
the evils of war, so far as military requirements permit" (my italics). None could 
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then have foreseen that one day the mass bombing of cities where civilian workers 
made armaments would become a "military requirement"; but it did, and is fully 
discussed in this book. The results of the Nuremberg Trials receive much less 
notice from Mr Best, but what he does say (pp. 291fT) is to the point - yet, for 
some reason, not indexed; why? c 
Mr Best has researched his subject thoroughly, and the abundant information 
in his text is supplemented by footnotes which are far more useful than the mere 
author-and-page references to which many modern writers confine themselves. 
His eleven-page bibliography is yet another valuable contribution, and his com-
ments are often shrewd. 
So far, so good; yet Mr Best has still failed to write a satisfactory book. 
A historian needs to do more than merely pick a good subject and research it well. 
He must also present his findings to the public in a readable form; and the value 
of Mr Best's book is most sadly damaged by the way he has written it. Writing is, 
of course, an art and we cannot all be artists, but we should try to make what we 
write comprehensible. This means, first of all, using a normal vocabulary of words 
familiar enough to merit being defined in the dictionaries commonly used by 
ordinary people. Too often, however, Mr Best employs words which are unknown 
to this reviewer's dictionary; and if we can perhaps guess what he means when he 
speaks of "pillagey and plundery" (p. 92), what are we to make of "immiseration" 
(p. 100)? His mistakes in grammar are also painfully frequent and so are cumbrous 
sentences of which one example must suffice, namely: 
A modest acquaintance with the social sciences relevant to 'conflict' and 
'violence' confirms my belief that, just as the mind of man may be understood 
for practical purposes as being subject to pushes and pulls in opposite direc-
tions at once - e.g. towards social harmony and comradeliness and 'peace' 
on the one side, and towards competitiveness, quarrelsomeness, and in the end, 
'war' on the other - so also, though in more complicated and usually more 
roundabout ways, may political societies in their relations with one another be 
understood as experiencing simultaneous contrary inclinations, some towards 
peaceful relations with their neighbours and others towards unpeaceful ones. 
(p. 135) 
In short, this is a book to which one would hesitate to refer even a keen graduate 
student, for fear his struggle to understand its prose would destroy his interest in 
its subject. 
One hopes, therefore, that, before he publishes again, Mr Best will seriously 
study the job of writing the short, clear sentences, composed of short and simple 
words, that make comprehensible English. In reading his present book one could 
not help recalling, rather wistfully, the style of his fellow military historian, William 
Napier, from whom one example may be quoted. Of a crisis in the storm of 
Badajoz in Apri11812, Napier wrote: 
A reinforcement from the French reserve then came up, a sharp action followed, 
both sides fired through the gate and the enemy retired, but Ridge fell and no 
man died that night with more glory - yet many died and there was much 
glory. 
Now one must admit that few of us can expect to look very good when 
compared with Napier at his best. Yet one may also observe that the storm 
of Badlijoz was a pretty involved subject and the prose in which Napier describes 
it is a first-rate model. In our example there are eight sentences, all short and 
numbering just forty-three words all told. Of those forty-three words none are 
abstract nouns ; and only a couple are of more than two syllables - "reinforcement" 
and "enemy". Finally - a good test - the whole excerpt can be read aloud 
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without pausing for breath. One could wish that more authors today would study 
Napier's way of making complex subjects easy for his readers; and one also 
wishes Mr Best the success in improving his own style which his research deserves . 
* * * 
Richard GLOVER, 
Victoria. 
HUBERT CHARBONNEAU et Andre LAROSE, ed. - Les grandes morta/ites: 
etude methodologique des crises demographiques du passe. Liege, Union interna-
tionale pour !'etude scientifique de Ia population, [1979]. 373 p. 
En 1975, avait lieu a Montebello dans le Quebec un colloque international 
qui regroupait soixante-quatorze participants, originaires d'une vingtaine de pays, 
dont I' objectif commun etait de comparer les resultats de leurs recherches sur les 
famines, les epidemi_es et autres fleaux demographiques d'autrefois, sans oublier 
les guerres. H. Charbonneau et A. LaRose se sont charges de reunir et de publier 
une selection des travaux de cette rencontre dont le bilan est considerable: 
vingt-six textes produits par un nombre ega! d'auteurs, venus de treize pays diffe-
rents, et traitant de cas de mortalites massives dans dix-huit pays du monde du XVIe 
siecle a nos jours. II va sans dire que cet effort de mise en commun, pour des 
fins comparatives, d'observations a propos d'evenements isoles et repartis d'une 
fa90n inegale dans le temps et dans l'espace, ne relevait pas d'un interet etroit pour 
I' unique et I' exceptio nne! mais visait a confronter des methodes et, peut-etre, 
a degager un modele applicable a tous les phenomenes de meme nature . 
Les invites de ce colloque avaient d'ailleurs ete saisis au prealable d'un 
premier schema exprime en une formule mathematique et mis au point par le 
Dr Thomas Hollingsworth, dont Ia preoccupation essentielle etait de determiner 
l'intensite de ces crises, leur duree et surtout leur extension (pp. 17-28). A cet 
egard, son projet de classement des crises tenait moins a leur nature qu'au 
territoire qu'elles touchaient, des villages et des regions jusqu'aux pays et meme 
au monde. Les principales variables incluses dans sa formule sont le nombre de 
deces, Ia duree de Ia crise et Ia population du territoire concerne. En plus de ces 
elements dits objectifs, le Dr Hollingsworth proposait d'integrer dans sa formule 
des facteurs subjectifs, puisque, dit-il, l'intensite de toute crise demographique 
«is essentially an intuitive idea, depending on human psychology and reactions>> 
(p. 26). S'il parait convenir a !'identification des crises, ce modele a ete serieuse-
ment mis en doute, lorsqu'il s'agit de mesurer adequatement leur intensite et 
!'impact des facteurs subjectifs en ce domaine (pp. 153-57, 171-79). En effet, Ia 
donnee Ia plus difficile a obtenir une fois que le nombre de deces est connu, est 
I' effectif de Ia population affectee par I' evenement. 
La methode proposee par Jacques Dupaquier resout sans peine ce probleme 
puisqu'il part du postulat que tout «indice de mesure de Ia mortalite doit etre 
fonde exclusivement sur les statistiques de deces >> (p. 84). Le calcul de cet indice 
resulte de Ia mise en rapport du nombre de deces pendant l'annee de Ia crise et du 
nombre moyen de deces pendant les dix annees encadrantes, soit les cinq annees 
anterieures et les cinq annees posterieures. Cet exercice, que nous decrivons som-
mairement ici, debouche en fin de compte sur Ia construction d'une echelle de 
